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Abstract
Using the change in ordinary dividend payout as a proxy for improved governance, we show that cross-
listing in the U.S. is associated with enhanced protection for the minority ordinary shareholders of exchange-
listed non-U.S. firms. These firms substitute dividends for enhanced governance. We find no such effect for
Rule 144a Portal firms. Interestingly, we document evidence inconsistent with the legal bonding hypothesis
for Level 1 OTC firms. We believe that their ability to pay lower dividends post-listing is primarily due to
their ability to credibly commit to fair treatment of their minority investors, given their record for equitable
treatment of their ordinary shareholders. They achieve this reputation by consistently paying out a sizable pro-
portion of their earnings as dividends. In addition, we find that the firm-level governance of Level 1 OTC firms,
as measured by the number of closely held shares improves in the post-listing period. We find no such effect for
SEC Rule 144a traded firms. Our results have also important implications for the agency models of dividends.
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1. Introduction
The ability of firms to finance investment opportunities, over and above retained earnings is
largely contingent on the effectiveness of their domestic legal system to sufficiently protect minor-
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ity shareholders. The extant literature suggests that where the providers of capital are sufficiently
protected, their required return is lower resulting in a lower cost of both debt and equity capital
for firms (e.g., Hail & Leuz, 2003). Consequently, high-growth firms domiciled in countries char-
acterised by poor legal institutional frameworks, and thus poor investor protection, are very often
constrained in their attempts to finance their growth opportunities externally (e.g., Demerguc-Kunt
& Maksimovic, 1998). Absent effective legal reform, many firms engage in substitute strategies
designed to fund their investment opportunity set. For example, the extant literature suggests that
such firms can engage in cross-border strategic alliances (e.g., Siegel, 2003), seek political favour
(e.g., Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Siegel, 2003), or commit themselves to greater protection
of their minority shareholders by improving their internal firm-level governance (e.g., Durnev &
Kim, 2005; Klapper & Love, 2004). Furthermore, a firm can substitute their domestic level gov-
ernance for the superior disclosure and regulatory regime of the United States by cross-listing on
a U.S. exchange or NASDAQ (e.g., Coffee, 1999, 2002; Doidge, 2004; Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz,
2004a; Reese & Weisbach, 2002; Stulz, 1999; Lins, Strickland, & Zenner, 2005). Consequently,
the ability of firms to finance their growth opportunities through domestic financing, post-listing
in the U.S., suggests a commitment on the part of firms to better protect their investors.1
By ‘opting-in’ to the U.S. governance regime, these firms endeavour to encourage investment
in their firm by committing to adopt the reporting obligations of domestic U.S. firms. As such, the
legal bonding hypothesis suggests that at least in terms of investor protection, investors should be
indifferent between investing in domestic U.S. firms or non-U.S. American depositary receipts.
However, this line of reasoning has been questioned within the literature. For example, its most
vocal critics (e.g., Licht, 2003, 2004; Siegel, 2005) consistently argue that the number of SEC
actions against ill-behaved foreign firms has been few, and Licht (2003) goes so far as to suggest
that the enforcement laws put in place by the SEC remain largely ‘illusionary’ for non-U.S. firms,
as non-U.S. firms are subjected to a less stringent regime than that laid out for U.S. firms. In
connection, Siegel (2005) outlines that over the period from 1995 to 2001 the SEC took legal
action against just five foreign firms.2 So while it appears that the holders of American Depositary
Receipts (ADRs) may not be as well protected as are the holders of domestically listed U.S. firms,
they do enjoy the benefits of ‘Reputational Bonding’ from listing in the U.S. (e.g., King & Segal,
2004; Siegel, 2005), i.e. enhanced monitoring from financial analysts, underwriters, auditors. In
support Stulz (2005, p. 1632) concludes that “Although this monitoring [from listing in the U.S.]
may at times seem weak and tentative, it is monitoring that otherwise would not have taken place”.
Finally, Doidge, Karolyi, Lins, Miller, and Stulz (2005) conclude that such monitoring acts as a
sizable deterrent preventing many firms from cross-listing.
We examine whether cross-listing in the U.S. affords additional protection to those investors
who have already made the investment decision and invested in the firm, i.e. the ordinary share-
holders, as opposed to those investors that invest post-listing, i.e. ADR holders. The majority
of non-U.S. firms that ‘opt-in’ to the U.S. governance regime do not ‘opt-out’ of their domestic
1 Ribstein (2005) outlines other alternatives to cross-listing. These include certification, a sale without listing and local
incorporation. In addition, a related literature outlines how domestic exchanges have in response to sizable migrations
of firms to U.S. capital markets improved their governance requirements. Dewenter, Kim, Lim, and Novaes (2005) and
Carvalho and Pennacchi (2005) examine the impact of enhanced stock exchange governance regulations on firm value
using Korean and Brazilian exchanges, respectively. They show that improved exchange governance enhances firm value.
In a similar vein, Krishnamurti, Sequeira, and Fangjian (2003) using the two major Indian stock exchanges demonstrate
how demutualized exchanges are superior to mutualized exchanges in terms of governance.
2 Joos (2003, p. 396) concludes that “At the very least, empirical work suggests that the effectiveness of the bonding
role of the SEC regulation presents an empirical question rather than an established fact”.
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regime. So while it is clear that the ADR holders are protected, although not to the same extent
as those investors that hold U.S. firms, it is not altogether clear as to whether the holders of the
firms’ ordinary shares enjoy the same level of additional investor protection. In fact, Aggarwal,
Dahiya, and Klapper (2005, p. 3) suggest that “ADR holders have better legal standing compared
to holders of the underlying security as the ADRs are purchased in the U.S”. We examine this
issue further.
In order to examine whether cross-listing in the U.S. provides incremental protection for
minority/ordinary shareholders, we follow the approach advocated by Benos and Weisbach (2004,
p. 229). They argue that, given that regulatory bonding in the U.S. is unobservable to the researcher,
“the issue of economic importance is whether managers and investors perceive cross-listings to
have incremental protection or not. To examine this proposition, the appropriate approach is not to
count SEC actions and debate whether they are important or not. Rather it is to examine the data
for empirical implications of the hypothesis that cross-listings provide incremental protection,
and therefore serve as a device enabling managers of non-U.S. firms to commit to protect the
interests of their minority shareholders”.
We examine the ordinary dividend payout of cross-listed firms around a cross-listing in the U.S.
Our choice of variable is motivated by the fact that (1) dividend payout is increasing in the level of
investor protection (e.g., LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000, hereafter LLSV)
and, consequently (2) changes in external investor protection are associated with changes in firm
dividend payout (e.g., Liu, 2002), controlling for firm, industry and country level determinants
of dividend payout. In addition, our choice of dependent variable is motivated by our desire to
isolate the impact of cross-listing on the domestic/ordinary shareholders (as against the ADR
shareholders) of cross-listed firms. We employ the ordinary dividend payout of firms to achieve
this goal. The agency models of dividends do not rely on specific rights per se, but rest on the
premise that country laws and/or governance practices allow minority shareholders greater rights
in general. We argue that firms may only be reluctant to pay lower dividends if they perceive that
their minority investors will accept lower dividends for improvements in investor protection, as
dividend cuts are costly. Minority/ordinary shareholders are more likely to accept lower dividends
post-listing if they are compensated for reduced dividends with enhanced protection from listing
in the U.S. Easterbrook (1984) outlined how governance practices and dividends are substitutes
for one another. We argue that the additional protection afforded to minority investors from listing
in the U.S. derive not only from additional general rights per se, but also from a reduced ability
of controlling insiders to consume private benefits (e.g., Barzuza, 2005; Doidge, 2004; Doidge,
Karolyi, Lins, Miller, & Stulz, 2005).
Using a sample of 496 cross-listed firms from forty countries we find that exchange-listed
firms pay significantly lower dividends, post-listing, and this finding is robust to the inclusion of
firm, industry and country controls.3 This result is consistent with the notion that these investors
are better protected under the U.S. regime. In line with our expectations we find no evidence
suggesting that the ordinary shareholders of Rule 144a firms benefit from incremental protection,
post-listing. Interestingly, our results suggest that the minority investors of Level 1 OTC firms
are better protected. Although inconsistent with the legal bonding hypothesis, we show that these
firms consistently establish a reputation for better protection of their investors by paying out a
greater proportion of their earnings as dividends. Consequently, their ability to pay lower dividends
3 We provide a detailed sample description in the working paper version of the paper. The working paper is available
at the following address: www.nuim.ie/academic/economics.
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post-listing may well result from a voluntary commitment on the part of these firm to protect their
investors that is credible given their reputation for fair treatment. In support of this argument we
find that the firm-level governance of Level 1 OTC firms, as measured by the number of closely
held shares improves in the post-listing period. We find no such effect for SEC Rule 144a traded
firms.
Our results have also important implications for the agency models of dividends. We find
support for both the outcome and substitution models of dividends. More specifically, we find that
in all cross-sectional periods, and over the full sample period, dividend payouts are significantly
higher in countries where minority investors enjoy greater legal protection. In addition, and in
line with Liu (2002), Zhang (2005), and Hwang, Park, and Park (2004), we document support in
favour of the substitute model of dividends: governance improvements substitute for dividends
as a mechanism of controlling the agency costs associated with free cash flow. This finding is
also consistent with the evidence that inter alia, improved governance helps explain why dividend
payouts have been falling over time (e.g., DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Skinner, 2003; Fama & French,
2002a).4 This of course suggests that the relation between dividend payouts and governance
is non-constant and as such purely cross-sectional tests are biased towards acceptance of the
outcome model of dividends. Our results suggest that both are not directly competing against one
another.
2. Cross-listing in the United States and the legal bonding hypothesis
Non-U.S. firms can cross-list in the U.S., either directly as ordinary shares or as American
Depositary Receipts.5 Other than Canadian and Israeli firms, the majority of non-U.S. firms list as
ADRs. A sponsored, public Level 1 OTC depositary receipt program is the simplest way for non-
U.S. firms to access U.S. and non-U.S. capital markets. They trade ‘over-the-counter’ and also on
some exchanges outside of the U.S., with prices published on the “Pink Sheets”. A Rule 144A
depositary receipt program, established by the SEC in 1990 facilitates access to U.S. and non-U.S.
markets through a private placement of sponsored depositary receipts to Qualified Institutional
Buyers. Trades are executed under the Portal system, and cleared through the Depositary Receipt
Trust. Like Level 1 ADRs, they do not require compliance with U.S. G.A.A.P. or SEC registration.
Under Regulation S, a company can offer a depositary receipt program to non-U.S. investors on
Designated Offshore Securities Markets ‘DOSM’. Unlike Level 1 OTC or SEC Rule 144a Portal
ADRs, cross-listing in the U.S. via a Level 2/3 exchange-listed ADR (or a direct listing on a U.S.
exchange or NASDAQ) obligates these firms to provide fuller disclosures under U.S. G.A.A.P.,
and operate under the mantra of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), thus becoming
subject to their enforcement powers. Furthermore, cross-listing in the U.S. also affords minority
investors the means to exercise effective and low-cost legal remedies, unavailable at home, and
exposes the firms to what Coffee (2002) terms “Reputational Intermediaries”: underwriters (in the
case of Level 3 capital-raising firms), financial analysts, auditors and bond rating agencies. The
extant literature has documented how each can play a vital role in monitoring firms, facilitating the
production of firm-specific private information into public information (see Lang, Lins, & Miller,
4 Interestingly, Ikenberry and Julio (2004) document a rebound in this trend. They show that since 2000 the proportion
of U.S. firms paying cash dividends has increased and relate much of this shift to the maturity hypothesis.
5 Dutch companies trade largely as New York Shares (NYS) in the United States. New York Shares (NYS) offer many of
the benefits of Depositary Receipts but they are less efficient in terms of cross-border settlement, and in their registration
process.
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2002). The legal bonding hypothesis outlines how such additional disclosures and monitoring
allows firms to effectively ‘rent’ the U.S. governance regime by listing on a U.S. exchange.
Unlike exchange-level ADRs, Level 1 OTC and Portal level ADRs are not required to become
“reporting companies” under the U.S. disclosure and regulatory environment (e.g., Coffee, 2002).
Accordingly, the incremental protection benefits that accrue to the shareholders of cross-listing
firms, if they do exist, apply only to exchange-listed ADRs. The different ADR classifications are
outlined in Appendix A.
3. Data and summary statistics
We begin our study by obtaining a complete list of depositary receipts from The Bank of New
York (www.adrbny.com) and cross-reference this list with additional data sourced from Deutsche
Bank (www.adr.db.com), JP Morgan (www.adr.com) and Citibank (wwss.citissb.com/adr). From
each we were able to obtain the names, listing dates, the firms’ country of origin, the type of
depositary receipt (Level 1 OTC, Level 2/3 Exchange (NYSE, Nasdaq, AMEX), Portal Rule
144a) as of July 2003. We also sourced a list of direct listings, for which the legal requirements of
cross-listing are essentially the same as those for exchange-listed ADRs from the official website
of the NYSE and NASDAQ. Supplementary data is sourced from the Over the Counter Bulletin
Board (OTCBB), the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the NASDAQ. For firms with joint
and simultaneous DR listings (OTC/Portal Programs) we classify these firms as Level 1 OTC
programs. If a firm has multiple DR programs, with different start dates, we classify this firm
according to its earliest DR program, and ignore any subsequent programs. Finally, we include
only those firms with sponsored DR programs; firms that voluntarily trade as ADRs in the U.S.
To be included in our final sample we imposed the following preconditions: (1) We only
include those firms for which data relating to both variants of our dependent variable is available
(2) We exclude those firms with either, missing (entirely) pre or post-listing dividend payout data.
This ‘Narrow’ sample approach is necessary to ensure that any conclusions that we make are
not due to a significant change in our sample makeup around the cross-listing data. We obtained
our non-cross listed sample from the country lists provided by Datastream. From the country
lists, we exclude all firms with a U.S. listing, and include only those firms in our sample with
data available on all our control variables. (3) Like Liu (2002), but unlike La Porta et al. (2000)
we include those firms from countries with mandatory dividend requirements. As a result, we
include firms from Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Greece and finally, (4) we exclude all financial
firms (firms with SIC beginning with 6). We also placed the following data restrictions on both
samples (both versions of our dependent variable): (I) we exclude observations due to probable
data errors; negative net sales or revenues, negative market-to-book assets, and negative dividends
paid. (II) In common with La Porta et al. (2000), and Liu (2002), we eliminate possible outliers
in our dependent variable(s) by removing the top 1% of outliers. (III) Due to possible errors in
scaling the data with net sale or revenues, we also eliminate outliers from each of our covariates
by eliminating the top and bottom 1% of observations.
After imposing these requirements, our final sample is comprised of 3418 firms from 40
countries: 496 of which are either firms trading in the U.S. as ADRs or listed directly on U.S.
Exchanges, the remaining 2922 are non cross-listed firms. Our non-cross-listed sample is domi-
nated by a combination of firms from Brazil (7.60%), Japan (23.41%) and the United Kingdom
(11.02%). On the other hand, 18 countries contribute less than 1% each of our non-cross-listed
sample. The majority of Level 1 ADRs are supplied by firms from Hong Kong (13.25%), the
United Kingdom (11.54%), Australia (5.98%), Brazil (5.56%), India (5.56%) and South Africa
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Table 1
Dividend payout levels by ADR classification (mean (median))
Non-cross list Level 1 Level 2/3 Rule 144a
Dividends-to-earnings
Full sample 38.00 (30.29) 35.92 (32.98) 32.20 (25.31) 34.64 (27.56)
Low anti-director 35.55 (29.84) 31.73 (30.94) 32.89 (31.35) 33.48 (18.25)
High anti-director 39.05 (30.53) 35.92 (32.85) 31.61 (22.56) 32.17 (23.62)
Dividends-to-cashflow
Full sample 20.42 (14.21) 20.22 (18.34) 16.14 (11.89) 17.69 (13.00)
Low anti-director 16.46 (11.69) 14.95 (13.13) 13.88 (12.22) 8.28 (5.46)
High anti-director 21.66 (14.93) 20.84 (18.23) 16.42 (11.31) 18.54 (13.90)
Significance tests (high vs. low)
Dividends-to-earnings
Mean −3.23*** −2.54** 0.42 0.0215
Median −6.93*** −2.22** 2.73*** −0.554
Dividends-to-cashflow
Mean −15.88*** −8.89*** −4.61*** −3.87***
Median −16.26*** −6.94*** −0.765 −4.43***
In this table we report mean and median dividend payout levels for non-cross-listed firms and cross-listed firms over the
full sample period. Dividends-to-cashflow and dividends-to-earnings are employed as our payout proxy. Both are defined
in the appendix. Dividend payouts for all cross-listed firms are calculated over the full sample period for each firm which
includes both the pre and post-listing period. For both cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms we report both t- and Z-stats
for the mean and median difference between high and low investor protection countries, respectively.
** Significance at the 5% level.
*** Significance at the 1% level.
(5.13%). Our exchange-listed Level 2/3 ADR sub-sample is dominated by firms from the U.K.
(20.69%), followed by France and Japan with 6.90% each. Non-surprisingly, the vast majority
of direct listings in the U.S. are Canadian firms (97.37%). Finally, India (26.00%) and Taiwan
(20.00%) make up the majority of firms that trade on the Portal under SEC Rule 144a.
We begin by outlining some summary payout measures for both cross-listed and non-cross-
listed firms. The results are outlined in Table 1. For both variants of our dependent variable, we
calculate both mean and median payout ratios over the full sample period. We outline summary
measures for all cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms, and then further sub-divide the represen-
tative categories into firms originating from both high and low investor protection countries. As
before, firms are characterised as either high or low investor protection firms according to their
countries anti-directors right index.
The most striking result from Table 1 is that Level 1 OTC firm’s payout a higher percentage of
their earnings as dividends than both exchange-listed and Rule 144a firms.6 Second, our sample
of non-cross-listed firms also pays our more dividends than both exchange-listed firms and Rule
144a firms, but pay slightly less (in terms of median payout) than Level 1 OTC firms. These results
6 In the working paper, we show that this relation holds in both the pre and post-listing periods. More specifically, we
find that of the 30 countries with Level 1 OTC listings, exactly half pay lower dividends, post-listing (15/30), 40% pay
higher dividends (12/30), and 10% remain unchanged (3/30). For exchange-listed ADRs, we find that of the 28 countries
with Level 2/3 ADRs, 57% (16/28) pay lower dividends post-listing, 11 of the 28 pay higher dividends and 1 remain
unaltered. Finally, for Rule 144a firms, 10 of 19 pay higher dividends; while 9/19 pay lower dividends, post-listing. The
results using dividend-to-cashflow mirror those of dividend-to-earnings.
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Fig. 1. Median dividends-to-earnings (%) for OTC, EXCH, PORTAL and NCL firms.
are replicated when dividends-to-cashflow is employed as our dependent variable. Interestingly,
the earlier relations are largely replicated for Level 1, Level 2/3, and Rule 144a firms from both
high and low investor protection countries. The results for low investor countries are especially
interesting. They suggest that Level 1 OTC firms pay higher dividends than both exchange-listed
and Rule 144a firms. This result may be driven by anti-directors rights measure differences within
the low investor protection class or it may point to a relation between firm-level governance and
dividend payout. To examine this issue further we plot the time series behaviour of dividend-
payout for cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms over the full sample period. The results are
reported in Figs. 1–12. In Figs. 1 and 2 we outline the time-series behaviour of dividend-payout
by ADR level. In the remaining figures we classify cross-listed firms according to both their ADR
level and their countries level of investor protection. The figures suggest that the findings from
Table 1 are largely replicated in each cross-section. For example, in almost every year, dividend
payouts are greater in those countries where investors are better protected. When we separate
firms by ADR level, we show that this relationship is unaffected. Finally, our earlier findings for
Level 1 OTC firms are replicated in Figs. 4–7 and 10. As before, both Level 1 OTC firms from
high and low investor protection countries pay significantly higher dividends than their exchange-
listed and Portal counterparts. Our finding that dividend payout is increasing in investor protection
is consistent with the findings of LLSV (2000). In addition, we show that this relationship has
persisted over time. In the next section we test the agency models of dividends in a dynamic
setting by, allowing investor protection to change for at least a subset of our sample, i.e. for Level
Fig. 2. Median dividends-to-cashflow (%) for OTC, EXCH, PORTAL and NCL firms.
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Fig. 3. Median dividends-to-earnings (%) for low IP OTC, EXCH, PORTAL and NCL.
Fig. 4. Median dividends-to-earnings (%) for high IP OTC, EXCH, PORTAL and NCL.
2/3 cross-listed firms. We hypothesise that if cross-listing in the U.S. is associated with enhanced
protection for the domestic investors of Level 2/3 listed firms, we should observe a change in
ordinary dividend payout.
4. Econometric specification
In the following section we outline the empirical methodology employed in the paper. In all
regressions we compare the change in ordinary dividend payout for cross-listed firms relative to
Fig. 5. Median dividends-to-cashflow (%) for low IP OTC, EXCH, PORTAL and NCL.
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Fig. 6. Median dividends- to-cashflow (%) for high IP OTC, EXCH, PORTAL and NCL.
Fig. 7. Median dividends-to-earnings (%) for OTC firms (low and high IP) and NCL.
non-cross-listed firms around the cross-listing date. This is motivated by the fact that regulatory
bonding in the U.S. is unobservable to the researcher. By examining the changes in ordinary
dividend payout, we seek to (1) isolate the impact of cross-listing ‘around’ the time of cross-listing
by controlling for firm, industry and country level determinants of ordinary dividend payout; (2)
allow this effect to vary across the different listing types (Level 1 OTC, Level 2/3 Exchange
lists, and SEC Rule 144a Portal ADRs) using a simple dummy variable specification; and (3) use
this change in dividend payments made to ordinary shareholders to make inferences about how
domestic investor protection has changed, post-listing.
Fig. 8. Median dividends-to-earnings (%) for EXCH firms (low and high IP) and NCL.
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Fig. 9. Median dividends-to-earnings (%) for PORTAL firms (high and low IP) and NCL.
Fig. 10. Median dividends-to-cashflow (%) for OTC firms (high and low IP) and NCL.
To estimate the effect of cross-listing on the ordinary dividend payout of firms, the following
regression specification is followed:
divit = α + Xitβ1 + δ1 OTCit + δ2 EXCHit + δ3 PORTALit + αt + αi + υit (1)
divit = α + Xitβ1 + δ1 OTC ADit + δ2 EXCH ADit + δ3 PORTAL ADit + αt + αi + υit
(2)
Fig. 11. Median dividends-to-cashflow (%) for EXCH firms (high and low IP) and NCL.
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Fig. 12. Median dividends-to-cashflow (%) for PORTAL firms (high and low IP) and NCL.
where divit is the ordinary dividend payout of firm i in year t. To ensure that our results are
not specific to our definition of firm dividend payout, we employ two different measures of
ordinary dividend payout. First, we employ the traditional measure of dividend payout, dividends
to earnings. (Div/Earn)it is defined ((dividends per share/earnings per share) × 100). Our second
measure, dividends-to-cashflow (Div/CF)it is defined similarly. OTCit, EXCHit and PORTALit are
dummy variables that identify whether an individual firm i is cross-listed in the United States at
time t either as a Level 1 OTC, Level 2/3 Exchange-listed ADR, or under SEC Rule 144a on Portal.
δ1, δ2, δ3 are parameters to be estimated. In the two-way fixed effects specification (Eq. (1)), these
parameters estimate the ‘causal’ effect of cross-listing on ordinary dividend payout within firms
that change from not-listing to listing, i.e. the within estimates. Xit is a vector of time-varying firm
and time-invariant country level variables (rather than include country fixed effects). t are time
fixed effects, and υit is a standard idiosyncratic disturbance term. In Eq. (2), we include interaction
variables where we interact the ADR dummy variables with the anti-director rights measure
provided by LLSV (1998). In our specification, AD is 1 if the firm originates in a country where
investors are poorly protected (anti directors rights <3). This specification allows us to measure
the governance effects of cross-listing for firms from countries where the protection afforded
to investors is poor.7 A priori, the sign of the coefficients δ1, δ2, δ3 and their significance are
ambiguous. Although we believe that the coefficients on OTC, Portal should be insignificant in line
with the predictions of the legal bonding hypothesis, the coefficient for exchange-listed firms is less
clear. The reasoning is as follows: given the considerable underdevelopment of legal institutions
in some countries (see LLSV, 1998), the prevailing wisdom suggests that the incremental investor
protections from listing in the U.S. should thus on theoretical grounds be greater for these firms.
On the other hand, Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004b) outline a theoretical model and provide
empirical support in favour of the notion that country and firm governance are complementary to
one another. As such, voluntary firm governance improvements are more effective in countries
where country governance is already effective. Mitton (2004) using a sample of emerging market
firms, finds additional support in favour of this proposition. Thus, the incremental governance
benefits of listing in the U.S. for ‘emerging market’ firms may not be as effective due to poor
governance at home.αi is unobserved firm level heterogeneity. We test whether these effects should
7 Our results are largely unaffected when we include the anti-director rights measure for each firm (measured at the
country level), rather than the binary variable approach adopted. The anti-director rights measure ranges from 1 to 6.
424 T.G. O’Connor / The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 46 (2006) 413–436
be treated as fixed or random by employing the standard Hausman (1978) test. The results (along
with the Mundlak (1978) test) suggest that both the Xit and αi are correlated, i.e. Cov(Xit αi) = 0.
Consequently, we estimate a two-way fixed effects model outlined in Eqs. (1) and (2). Tests adopted
from Baum (2001), Drukker (2003) and Wiggins (2003) suggest that the idiosyncratic errors
are not independent and identically distributed. Consequently in all specifications, our reported
standard errors are robust to both heteroscedasticity and arbitrary within-group correlation using
Rogers (1993) standard errors clustered by firm. In addition to the tests outlined we also test
for the presence of ‘Firm’ and ‘Time’ effects in the residuals by using the intuitive approach
outlined in Petersen (2005). These results suggest that in line with our prior expectations, the
error term contains a large firm effect, but a smaller time effect which is common in corporate
finance panel data sets. In the presence of such Petersen (2005) advocates the superiority of
using Rogers (1993) standard errors clustered by firm, given the inclusion of fixed time effects
(αt).8
In our second empirical specification, we use a Tobit model to control for data censoring
given that dividend payout is left censored at zero. The results of the Hausman (1978) test out-
lined in the previous paragraph suggest that the individual specific effects are correlated with
the regressors. Unlike the fixed effects model, it is impossible within the Tobit specification to
eliminate the αi by differencing them out. Furthermore, the unobserved effects cannot be con-
ditioned out of maximum likelihood. Consequently, there exists no fixed effects Tobit model.
In order to overcome this we adopt the approach of Wooldridge (2002). He shows that one
can use a general Chamberlain (1984) style model by specifying the unobserved heterogene-
ity as a function of firm level means of included regressors, as specified by Mundlak (1978)
so:
αi = ¯Xiς + ai where ¯Xi = (1/T )
∑T
s=1Xit . The mean of time-invariant regressors are
excluded. The firm level means are substituted into Eqs. (1) and (2) yielding the follo-
wing:
divit = α + Xitβ1 + δ1 OTCit + δ2 EXCHit + δ3 PORTALit + ¯Xiξ + υitζ (3)
divit = α + Xitβ1 + δ1 OTC ADit + δ2 EXCH ADit + δ3 PORTAL ADit + ¯Xiζ + υit (4)
Eqs. (3) and (4) are estimated using Pooled Tobit (e.g., Wooldridge, 2002). In all specifica-
tions the regression standard errors are robust to non-normality, heteroscedasticity and arbitrary
within-group correlation (e.g., Hardin (2005)). We present results for the Pooled Tobit model in
Tables 2 and 3 and use the fixed effects estimates (unreported) to validate the results we report
for the Pooled Tobit model.
Our firm level controls, Xit includes the following: (1) Firms Investment Opportunity Set
(Market to Book Value of Assets) (e.g., Rozeff, 1982) (2) Profitability of Assets in place (ROE).
Return on Equity is calculated as earnings per share divided by book growth per share (3)
Firm Size (Total Assets (Log)) (4) Free Cash Flow (FCF), (e.g., Jensen, 1986) (5) Operating and
Financial Leverage (Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) and Debt), (e.g., Fazzari et al., 1988) and (6)
Earnings Volatility (EPS) (e.g., Fama and French, 2002a, 2002b) is calculated as the variance
of the previous three years earnings per share. To conserve space, in Tables 2 and 3 we present
results using only MBA, size and profitability as firm-level controls. The results are not affected
8 Absent appropriate adjustment of the standard errors, we show in the working paper that the standard errors are
consistently underestimated by as much as 200% for some of the regressors.
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Table 2
Pooled Tobit analysis of dividend policy of cross-listed firms
Variable Sign Pooled Tobit
(1) dy/dx (2) dy/dx (3) dy/dx (4) dy/dx
OTC ± −1.22 (−0.59) −0.6742 −9.28 (−4.2)*** −5.12 −9.25 (−4.2)*** −5.10 −10.57 (−4.8)*** −5.79
EXCH ± −7.38 (−2.4)** −3.93 −19.96 (−5.4)*** −10.32 −19.84 (−5.3)*** −10.27 −20.07 (−5.5)*** −10.38
PORTAL ± −0.78 (−0.15) −0.43 −8.16 (−1.56) −4.51 −8.61 (−1.60) −4.74 −9.15 (−1.71)* −5.03
Intercept 24.56 (5.44)*** −41.37 (−10)*** – −44.17 (−5.3)*** – −45.86 (−5.6)*** –
MBA − – −0.67 (−4.3)*** −0.39 −0.67 (−4.3)*** −0.38 −0.69 (−4.4)*** −0.40
ROE + – 0.06 (2.1)** 0.036 0.06 (2.1)** 0.037 0.06 (2.2)** 0.032
Log (total asset) + – 6.32 (4.55)*** 3.66 6.29 (6.46)*** 3.65 6.12 (6.38)*** 3.58
ADR dividend ± – 16.71 (5.4)*** 10.65 16.59 (5.26)*** 10.56 16.85 (5.38)*** 10.75
Anti-director + – 5.63 (3.77)*** 3.19 – –
Common law + – – – – – 5.65 (4.28)*** 3.32
Industry effects Yes Yes – Yes Yes
Time effects No No – No – No –
Observations 29691 21116 – 21116 – 21116 –
Censored Obs 5541 3312 – 3312 – 3312 –
Log likelihood −131195 −94759 −94734 −94724
In this table we report Pooled Tobit coefficient and marginal effects estimates of the effect of cross-listing on the ordinary dividend payouts of cross-listed firms around the
cross-listing date. The final sample is comprised of 496 cross-listed firms and 2922 non-cross-listed firms from 40 countries over the period from 1990 to 2002. Firm-level
controls are sourced from both Worldscope and Datastream and are defined in the appendix. Country controls are also defined in the appendix. In each specification we report
results for firms trading in the U.S. either Over-the-Counter (OTC) as a Level 1 ADR, a Level 2/3 Exchange-Listed ADR (EXCH), or on the Portal under Rule 144a (PORTAL).
The Pooled Tobit standard errors are robust to non-normality and heteroscedasticity in the errors and are also clustered by firm to account for arbitrary within-group correlations.
Z-stats reported for the Pooled Tobit. In columns 1–4 we include but do not report the estimates of the firm level means. In all but one specification, an F-test suggests that they
are jointly significant at the 1% level. The marginal effects are calculated at the mean of the independent variables. For the dummy variables the marginal effects is calculated
as the discrete change in F(x) as the dummy variable x changes from 0 to 1.
* Significance at the 10% level.
** Significance at the 5% level.
*** Significance at the 1% level.
426
T
.G
.O
’Connor/TheQuarterly
Review
ofEconom
ics
a
nd
Finance
46(2006)413–436
Table 3
Tobit analysis of dividend policy of cross-listed firms by legal origin
Variable Sign Pooled Tobit
(1) dy/dx (2) dy/dx (3) dy/dx (4) dy/dx
OTC AD ± −5.60 (−1.31) −3.01 −11.11 (−2.47)** −6.03 −7.11 (−1.53) −3.95 −10.37 (−2.2)** −5.66
EXCH AD ± −6.45 (−1.22) −3.44 −22.42 (−3.2)*** −11.34 −18.41 (−2.6)*** −9.54 −21.09 (−3.0)*** −10.76
PORTAL AD ± 8.62 (0.74) 4.90 1.03 (0.16) 0.60 4.96 (0.77) 2.97 1.99 (0.342) 1.17
Intercept 25.38 (5.63)*** −20.30 (−4.6)*** – −22.27 (−0.82) – −25.91 (−0.95) –
MBA − – −0.66 (−4.3)*** −0.39 −0.66 (−4.2)*** −0.39 −0.68 (−4.3)*** −0.39
ROE + – 0.06 (2.04)** 0.035 0.06 (2.3)** 0.035 0.06 (2.3)** 0.032
Log (total asset) + – 5.65 (5.84)*** 3.28 5.63 (5.81)*** 3.27 5.51 (5.71)*** 3.19
ADR dividend ± 8.48 (2.85)*** 5.16 7.85 (2.63)*** 4.76 7.76 (2.63)** 4.71
Anti-director + – – – 4.71 (3.02)*** 2.68 – –
Common law + – – – – – 4.85 (3.69)*** 2.84
Industry effects Yes – Yes Yes – Yes
Time effects No No – No – No
Observations 29691 – 21116 – 21116 – 21116
Censored Obs 5541 3312 – 3312 – 3312
Log likelihood −131210 −94820 – −94804 – −94794
In this table we report Pooled Tobit coefficient and marginal effects estimates of the effect of cross-listing on the ordinary dividend payouts of cross-listed firms around the
cross-listing date. The final sample is comprised of 496 cross-listed firms and 2922 non-cross-listed firms from 40 countries over the period from 1990 to 2002. Firm-level
controls are sourced from both Worldscope and Datastream and are defined in the appendix. Country controls are also defined in the appendix. In each specification we report
results for firms trading in the U.S. either Over-the-Counter (OTC) as a Level 1 ADR, a Level 2/3 Exchange-Listed ADR (EXCH), or on the Portal under Rule 144a (PORTAL).
In this specification we interact the ADR Dummies with an investor rights measure developed by LLSV (1998). The ADR measure is 1 if the firm is domiciled in a country
where investors are poorly protected (AD < 3). The Pooled Tobit standard errors are robust to non-normality and heteroscedasticity in the errors and are also clustered by firm
to account for arbitrary within-group correlations. Z-stats reported for the Pooled Tobit. In columns 1–4 we include but do not report the estimates of the firm level means. In
all but one specification, an F-test suggests that they are jointly significant at the 1% level. For the dummy variables the marginal effects is calculated as the discrete change in
F(x) as the dummy variable x changes from 0 to 1.
** Significance at the 5% level.
*** Significance at the 1% level.
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when we include the remaining firm-level control variables. All variables are summarised in
Appendix B.
In Appendix C, we outline correlation coefficients and deal explicitly with concerns relating
to multicollinearity by computing variance inflation factors. The correlation coefficients are by
and large of the correct size. For example, (Div/Earn)it is positively related to profitability (ROE)
and size, and negatively related to both volatility of earnings and growth opportunities (MBA).
Surprisingly, both (Div/Earn)it and (Div/CF)it are negatively related to free cash flow, although
neither are significant. Finally, the small variance inflation factors suggest that multicollinearity
is not a significant problem in our data set.
We employ two country dummies to control for variations in dividend payout across legal
regimes: (1) A simple 0/1 dummy for legal origin; 1 if the country employs common law, and 0
if the firm adopts civil law (2) We also employ a second dummy that accounts for cross-country
differences in investor protection; we classify those firms as firms from high investor protec-
tion countries if their anti-director score is equal to or greater than the median value of 3 (La
Porta et al., 1998) and control for payout differences across industries by classifying each firm
in our sample according to their primary standard industry classification code.9 We repeat our
analysis by including American Depositary Receipt Dividends as a covariate in our equations.
ADR dividends are ordinary share dividends paid to the holders of ADRs, converted to U.S.
Dollars at the prevailing spot exchange rate. We have no prior beliefs on the sign of the coef-
ficient. For example, cross-listed firms with a history of paying dividends may also be those to
pay a dividend to their ADR shareholders. Furthermore, we find that the inclusion of ADR div-
idends does not alter our main conclusions. All ADR dividend data is sourced from The Bank
of New York (www.adrbny.com). All variables employed in our empirical analysis are defined in
Appendix B.
5. Results
In both Tables 2 and 3, we present the results that estimate the effect of cross-listing on the
ordinary dividend payout of cross-listed firms. In Table 2 we present the Pooled Tobit results
corresponding to equation 3. In Table 3, we employ interaction variables to assess the impact of
cross-listing on the dividend payout of firms originating from countries where minority investors
are poorly protected. In both tables, we outline regression results with the cross-listing dum-
mies only (column 1), the cross-listing dummies with firm level controls (column 2), and in
columns (3 and 4) we augment the ADR dummies and the firm level controls with country
level governance variables. In column (3) and we employ the LLSV (1998) anti-director rights
measure, and in column (4) we include a dummy variable corresponding to whether a firm is
domiciled in a common law jurisdiction. Both variables are expected to impact positively on
dividend payout (e.g., LLSV, 2000). All our findings are robust to the inclusion of dividends to
cashflow as our dependent variable. In addition to reporting the coefficient estimates, we also
report the marginal effects at the means of each variable. For the dummy variables the marginal
effects are calculated as the discrete change in F(x) as the dummy variable x changes from
0 to 1.
9 Based on this classification we form seven industry dummies; (1) Agriculture, Fishing, and Forestry (2) Mining and
Construction (3) Manufacturing (4) Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services (5) Wholesale
and retail trade (6) Services and (7) Public Administration. We exclude all finance, insurance, and real estate firms (SIC
beginning with 6).
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We begin by outlining the results from Table 2. The first major result from Table 2 is that
exchange-listed firms pay significantly lower dividends, post-listing. This finding is robust to
both the inclusion of both firm and country controls (and industry controls in the case of the
Pooled Tobit model). This is important given that those firms that cross-list are very often those
with sizable growth opportunities, proxied here by market to book of assets. We show that even
after including this control, exchange-listed firms pay significantly lower dividends, post-listing.
Thus our results are not driven by the sizable investment opportunity set of cross-listed firms. This
result is in line with the results reported by Mitton (2004) for a sample of emerging market cross-
listed firms and suggests that firms substitute dividends for improved firm-level governance. This
result is also consistent with the findings of Liu (2002), who outlines how functional convergence
measures initiated are associated with lower dividend payouts. Our finding for Level 2/3 listed
firms suggest that rather than compete with one another, the outcome and substitute models of
dividends are not mutually exclusive to one another. Rather, our results suggest a role for both
in explaining the relationship between investor protection and firm dividend payout. Like Liu
(2002), our results suggest that cross-sectional tests are biased towards an acceptance of the
outcome model of dividends.
In all specifications, the country and firm level controls are highly significant and of the
expected sign. For example, larger and profitable firms pay higher dividends, while firms with
sizable growth opportunities retain a sizable amount of earnings, rather than pay dividends. In
line with our expectations, firms from common law countries with efficient legal and institu-
tional frameworks pay significantly higher dividends (see LLSV, 2000). Finally, we document
that firms that pay an ADR dividend also pay larger dividends suggesting a possible clientele
effect. In Table 3, we examine the impact of cross-listing on dividend policy for firms from
countries with a poor record for protecting minority investors. Comparing Tables 2 and 3 the
results suggest that although the magnitudes of the Tobit estimates are broadly similar, their sig-
nificance is not as strong when compared to the same results in Table 2. This suggests that the
benefits to listing may not be as great for firms from poor-investor protection countries, consistent
with the notion that firm and country governance improvements are in fact complementary to
one another.
The results for Rule 144a firms are consistent with theory. The results from both Tables 2 and 3
suggest that cross-listing in the U.S. confers no additional protection benefits for the ordinary
shareholders of these firms. In almost all specifications Rule 144a firms do not significantly
change the amount that they pay to their ordinary shareholders. Finally, the results that we
report for Level 1 OTC firms are very interesting. We find in all regression specifications that
these firms pay significantly lower dividends, post-listing, a result consistent with the notion that
like exchange-listed firms, these firms substitute dividends for enhanced governance. However,
this warrants further discussion. Level 1 OTC firms do not adhere to the U.S. legal and reg-
ulatory regime as Level 1 OTC firms are exempt from becoming ‘reporting’ companies under
the terms of the Level 1 ADR agreement. Consequently, our finding that these firms pay siz-
able and significantly lower dividends post-listing is inconsistent with any of the predictions
of the legal bonding hypothesis. In the next section we attempt to shed more light on this
finding.
6. Firm level governance
Our findings for Level 1 OTC firms may be consistent with the notion of reputational
bonding: both King and Segal (2004) and Siegel (2004) document that even absent effec-
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tive legal bonding, a firm can still voluntarily bond themselves to fair treatment of their
minority investors. In addition, the evidence from Section 3 suggests that Level 1 OTC
firms from both strong and weak investor protection countries establish a strong reputa-
tion for the protection of investors by paying a greater proportion of their earnings as div-
idends, relative to both exchange-listed and Portal firms, and this relation holds in the pre
and post-listing periods. Consequently, the ability of Level 1 OTC ADRs to pay lower
dividends post-listing, may result from voluntary measures initiated by them post-listing,
e.g. firm level governance improvements (e.g., Durnev & Kim, 2005) and/or as a direct
result of their reputation for fair treatment of minority shareholders. In fact Pinnegar and
Ravichandran (2004, p. 8) in their study of Rule 144a/Reg S firms suggest as much when
they conclude that “the reputation of the issuer may be as important as ownership concen-
tration or the legal environment in protecting minority shareholders rights”. The valuation
premiums that Level 1 OTC firms generate post-listing are also consistent with the notion
that these firms benefit from reputational bonding, post-listing (e.g., Durand, Tan, & Tarca,
2005).
To examine whether non-exchange-listed firms (Level 1 OTC and SEC Rule 144a) vol-
untarily commit to bond themselves to fair treatment of their minority shareholders through
improved firm-level governance, we proxy for firm-level governance using the number of
closely held shares and examine its behaviour around a cross-listing. A fall in the number
of closely held shares implies an improvement in firm-level governance. Numerous recent
papers have employed closely held shares to proxy for firm-level governance (e.g., Holland
& Warnock, 2003). From our original sample of 496 cross-listed firms, we are able to source
from Worldscope data on Closely Held Shares for 214 Level 1 OTC firms, 137 Level 2/3
ADRs (including ordinary lists) and 49 SEC Rule 144a Portal firms. The results are outlined in
Table 4.
In Table 4, we outline for each ADR level, the median value of closely held shares in
the two years prior to listing, and on the list year. In the subsequent rows, we calculate
the change in closely held shares between the five year post-listing (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) period
and the two years pre-listing (−2, −1), i.e. [(1, −2), (1, −1), (2, −2), (2, −1),
(3, −2), (3, −1), (4, −2), (4, −1), (5, −2), (5, −1)]. For example, (3, −1)
refers to the change in closely held shares one year prior to listing to three years post-
listing. In the case of OTC firms this change is negative, implying an improvement in firm-
level governance. In the remaining rows of Table 4, we outline the median value of closely
held shares in the pre and post-listing period. The difference is outlined in the final row.
We begin by discussing the results for Level 1 OTC firms. Our findings suggest that non-
exchange-listed Level 1 firms improve their firm level governance in the post-listing period.
For example, the number of shares closely held is lower in almost every period post-listing,
relative to the two years pre-listing. The number of shares closely held by Level 1 OTC
firms is almost 33% lower three years post-listing relative to the year prior to listing. We
find the opposite for SEC Rule 144a firms; in every period post-listing, we find that the
level of closely held shares is greater than in the pre-listing period (column 4). Interestingly,
the results for both Level 1 OTC and SEC Rule 144a firms are consistent with our find-
ings reported in Section 3: Level 1 OTC firms consistently pay higher dividends relative to
both Level 2/3 exchange-listed firms, and SEC Rule 144a firms. As such these firms estab-
lish a reputation for fair treatment of their investors by paying out a sizable proportion of
their earnings as dividends. Interestingly, the results for Level 2/3 exchange-listed firms are
mixed.
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Table 4
Before/after closely held shares for cross-listed firms
Level 1 OTC,
median CHS
Level 2/3 exchange,
median CHS
Rule 144a portal,
median CHS
−2 85,116 37,604 15,476
−1 101,690 40,830 15,113
List year 88,581 53,168 33,570
(1, −2) 14,783 6,569 4,830
(1, −1) (1,791) 3,343 5,193
(2, −2) 871 (5,996) 32,574
(2, −1) (15,703) (9,222) 32,937
(3, −2) (16,346) 8,278 45,331
(3, −1) (32,920) 5,052 45,694
(4, −2) (15,499) 11,410 11,295
(4, −1) (32,073) 8,184 11,653
(5, −2) 592 (12,670) 11,295
(5, −1) (15,982) (15,896) 11,658
Before 73,830 44,266 10,080
After 80,707 48,453 23,484
Difference 6,877 4,187 13,404
In the preceding table we report before/after estimates of closely held shares (firm governance) for firms that cross-list in
the United States. We report the median closely held share value for firms that list either as Level 1 OTC ADRs (n= 214),
exchange-listed level 2/3 ADRs (n= 137) and ordinary lists, or that trade under SEC Rule 144a on Portal (n= 49). Closely
held shares (CHS) are shares held by insiders and is provided by Worldscope. We calculate the change in CHS between
the five year post-listing (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) period and the two years pre-listing (−2, −1) [(1, −2), (1, −1), (2, −2), (2,
−1), (3, −2), (3, −1), (4, −2), (4, −1), (5, −2), (5, −1)].
7. Concluding remarks
The ability of firms to finance their investment opportunity set externally is largely con-
tingent on the effectiveness of their domestic legal system to protect the interests of their
minority shareholders. In a country characterised by poor legal protection of investors, firms
are very often constrained in their attempts to fund their growth opportunities. To rectify
this, a number of firms have, over the course of the last decade sought to substitute their
home level governance for the superior governance of the U.S. by listing on an organised
U.S. exchange. Reese and Weisbach (2002) document that, exchange-listed ADRs capitally
constrained at home pre-listing, were no longer post-listing. This line of reasoning suggests
that the domestic investors of these firms are better protected post-listing. We test this
proposition.
In order to do so we employ the agency models of dividends introduced by LLSV (2000).
We examine the ordinary dividend payout of cross-listed firms around a cross-listing in the U.S.
Our choice of variable is motivated by the fact that (1) dividend payout is increasing in the level
of investor protection (La Porta et al., 2000) and, consequently (2) changes in external investor
protection are associated with changes in firm dividend payout (Liu, 2002), controlling for firm,
industry and country level determinants of dividend payout. We hypothesise that if the investors of
exchange-listed firms are better protected, firms are more likely to pay lower dividends. We argue
that ordinary shareholders are compensated for this reduced dividend payment with enhanced
protection.
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Using a sample of 496 cross-listed firms from forty countries, we show that exchange-listed
firms pay significantly lower dividends post-listing, and this finding is robust to the inclusion of
firm, industry and country controls. This result is consistent with the notion that these investors are
better protected under the U.S. regime. In line with our expectations we find no evidence that the
ordinary shareholders of Rule 144a firms benefit from incremental protection, post-listing. Inter-
estingly, our results suggest that the minority investors of Level 1 OTC firms are better protected.
Although inconsistent with the legal bonding hypothesis, we show that these firms consistently
establish a reputation for better protection of their investors by paying out a greater proportion of
their earnings as dividends. Consequently, their ability to pay lower dividends post-list may well
result from a voluntary commitment on the part of these firm to protect their investors that is cred-
ible given their reputation for fair treatment. We show that there is evidence to suggest that these
firms improve their firm level governance post-listing. The payment of substantially higher divi-
dends by these firms suggests a commitment on their part to bond to fair treatment of their ordinary
shareholders.
Finally, our findings outline the importance of testing the agency models of dividends both
cross-sectionally, and across time. Like Liu (2002), we find empirical support in favour of both
models; dividend payouts are larger in countries where investors are better protected. In addition
we show that this relationship has persisted over time. Second, and consistent with the findings
of Liu (2002), we show that governance reforms are associated with lower firm dividend payouts.
Liu’s (2002) findings suggest that country functional convergence reforms (as opposed to legal
reforms) substitute for dividends in controlling the agency costs associated with free cash flow.
Our findings suggest that governance reforms initiated at the level of the firm, and not the country,
are effective reforms. This suggests that cross-listing in the U.S. does enhance the protection of
the domestic investors of those firms that list.
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Appendix A. American depositary receipts (ADR) characteristics
Level I Level II Level III 144a
Primary exchange OTC ‘pink sheets’ NYSE, AMEX, or
NASDAQ
NYSE, AMEX, or
NASDAQ
PORTAL1
Accounting standards Home country U.S. GAAP U.S. GAAP Home country
U.S. reporting requirements Exempt Rule
12g3-2(b),
compliance2,
securities act of
1934
Form 20-F3 and
Form 6-K,
securities act of
1934
Form 20-F
(annual) and Form
6-K, securities act
of 1934
Exempt Rule 12g3-2(b), compliance or Rule 144a
SEC registration Exempt Full registration Full registration Exempt
Equity issuance Existing shares
only (public
offering)
Existing shares
only (public
offering)
New equity capital
(public offering4)
New equity capital (private offering to QIBs5)
Time to completion 10 weeks 10 weeks 14 weeks 16 days
Costs <$25,000 $200,000–700,000 $500,000–2,000,000 $250,000–500,000
Sources: Citibank, Deutsche Bank, Bank of New York.
1 PORTAL is an acronym for private offerings, resales and trading through automated linkages.
2 Under certain circumstances, the SEC exempts non-U.S. corporations wishing to trade their shares in the U.S. from the full reporting burden. The Information Supplying
Exemption, also known as Rule 12g 3-2(b), can be obtained by those non-U.S. corporations that are not seeking a listing on a national exchange and are not intending to launch
a public offering of their securities.
3 A Form 20-F is filed as a registration statement/annual report by issuers of Level II or III sponsored ADR/GDR. It is a comprehensive report of all material business activities
and financial results and must comply with U.S. GAAP. The Form 20-F consists of four parts. Part I requires a full description of the issuers business, details of its property, any
outstanding legal proceedings, taxation and any exchange controls that might effect security holders. Part II requires a description of any securities to be registered, the name of
the depositary bank for the DRs and all fees to be charged to the holders of DRs. Part III contains information on any defaults upon senior securities. Part IV requires various
financial statements to be submitted.
4 Foreign Issuers planning a public offering in the U.S. via a Level III ADR must register the proposed new securities by filing Form F-l.
5 Qualified institutional buyers (QIBs) are investors eligible to participate in the Rule 144a Market. The SEC defines these primarily as institutions that manage at least $100
million in securities including banks, savings and loans, insurance companies, investment companies, public employee benefit plans, employee benefit plans under ERISA, or an
entity owned entirely by qualified investors. Also included are registered broker-dealers owning and investing, on a discretionary basis, $10 million in securities of non affiliates.
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Appendix B. Variable descriptions
Variable Sign Abbreviation Source Description
Dividends-to-earnings N/A Div/Earn Worldscope Dividends per share represent the
total amount of dividends declared
during the year, earnings per share
represent the earnings for the year
Dividends-to-cashflow N/A Div/CF Worldscope Dividends per share represent the
total amount of dividends declared
during the year, cash flow per share
represents the cash earnings per share
of the company
Market-to-book assets − MBA Datastream Also called discount to net asset
value, divides the market value by the
net book value
Free-cash-flow + FCF/net sales Worldscope Earnings before interest and taxation
(EBIT) + depreciation depletion and
amortization (DDA) − capital
expenditures
Debt − Debt/net sales Worldscope Total debt represents all interest
bearing and capitalized lease
obligations. It is the sum of long and
short term debt
Cost of goods sold − COGS/net sales Worldscope COGS represents specific or direct
manufacturing cost of labour and
material in the production of finished
goods
Return on equity + ROE Worldscope EPS divided by the book growth per
share (expressed as a %)
EPS volatility − EPS Worldscope The variance of the previous three
years EPS
Net sales N/A – Worldscope Represents gross sales and other
operating revenue less discounts,
returns and allowances
Log (total assets) + Log (total assets) Worldscope Total assets represents the sum of
total current assets, long term
receivables, investment in
unconsolidated subsidiaries, other
investments, net property plant and
equipment and other assets
D (law) + Common law LLSV (2000) D = 1 the firm originates from a
common law country
D (investor protection) + Anti-director LLSV (1998) D = 1 if a firm originates in a country
where investors are highly protected
(anti-director rights ≥ median of 3)
Industry dummies N/A Worldscope Primary standard classification codes
(SIC).
ADR dividend ± ADR dividend Bank of New York D = 1 if a firm pays an ADR Dividend
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Appendix C. Correlation coefficient matrix and variance-inflation factors
Div/Earn Div/CF COGS ROE Earn Vol FCF Debt MBA Log (TA) VIF (DE)
Div/Earn 1 –
Div/CF 0.5937*** 1 –
COGS −0.0116** −0.0315*** 1 1.01
ROE 0.0206*** 0.1442*** −0.0446*** 1 1.08
Earnings volatility −0.0310*** −0.0443*** 0.0202*** −0.0233*** 1 1.00
Free cash flow −0.0029 −0.0050 −0.0008 −0.0084 0.0006 1 1.00
Debt −0.0070 −0.0060 −0.0005 −0.0116*** 0.0012 0.5411*** 1 1.01
Market book assets −0.0303*** 0.0159*** −0.0647*** 0.1730*** −0.0206*** −0.0065 −0.0028 1 1.06
Log (total assets) 0.0984*** −0.0153*** −0.0288*** −0.1240*** 0.0206*** −0.0361*** −0.0598*** −0.0540*** 1 1.03
In this table we outline Pearson correlation coefficients for our dependent variables and all our independent variables. In addition, we outline employing both variants of our
dependent variable, variance-inflation factors (VIFs). The variance-inflation factors are defined as (1/(1 −R)), where R2 is from a regression (pooled) of an explanatory variable
on a constant and the remainder of the explanatory variables. All of the variables are defined in appendix.
** Significance at the 5% level of significance.
*** Significance at the 1% level of significance.
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